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Chapter 295: Codification of California's Fair Employment




Government Code § 12951 (enacted).
AB 800 (Wesson); 2001 STAT. Ch. 295.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Census Bureau's 2000 Census reveals the increasing
diversity of California's population.' In its press statement releasing the
preliminary results of the 2000 Census, the Bureau reported that "[h]alf of the
nation's Hispanic population live[s] in California or Texas. 2 According to the
1990 Census, over 8.5 million Californians speak a language other than English
at home.'
As the State's population continues to diversify, its people become
increasingly aware that discrimination based on national origin or ancestry may
be prevalent in business practices in California. Certain workplace language
policies, which restrict the use of specific languages in the workplace, potentially
constitute discrimination based on national origin.' Typically, these restrictions
take the form of "English only" policies.
The law has protected California workers from various forms of
discrimination in employment for over two decades. In 1980, the California
1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2000) (reporting that 32.4 percent of
Californians listed their ethnicity as "Hispanic or Latino [in] origin"), available at http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Census 2000 Paints Statistical Portrait of the Nation's
Hispanic Population (May 10, 2001), available at http://www/census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/cbOl-
81 .html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE (1990) (detailing compilation of 1990 Census data for
persons age 5 years and older), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemollang-use.html
(last modified Nov. 7, 2000) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 2 (July 17, 2001) (quoting
Assemblymember Wesson's statement explaining that language is tied to national origin, and rules prohibiting
the use of one's native language are discriminatory and create an oppressive and intimidating workplace).
5. Id.
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Legislature added section 12940 to the Government Code.6 The statutes, entitled
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),7 assert that employees have a
right to seek and hold employment free of discrimination.' The California Fair
Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC) promulgates regulations used to
enforce the FEHA.9
Currently, FEHC regulations restrict businesses from implementing
restrictive workplace language policies.'° Under these regulations, employers are
only relieved of liability for discrimination when they implement restrictive
language policies based on a business necessity and only after notifying
employees of the policy and of the consequences of violating the policy."
Chapter 295 codifies the provisions of these pre-existing regulations, enabling
Californians the benefit of employment free from discriminatory language
policies.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Federal provisions governing workplace language policies are contained in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations.'
2
California state provisions are contained in the FEHC regulations." The
regulations of both agencies prohibit implementation of restrictive workplace
language policies. 
4
Federal courts agree that implementation of a restrictive language policy in
order to intentionally discriminate, without a showing of business necessity, is
unlawful.'5 However, there is substantial divergence among federal court
decisions addressing whether restrictive language policies have a disparate
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2001).
7. Id.
8. See id. (stating that California public policy prohibits intentional or unintentional harassment and
discrimination in employment).
9. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7285.3-.7 (2001) (explaining the powers and duties of the FEHC).
10. Id. § 7289.5.
11. Id. § 7289.5(d).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1-.8 (2001).
13. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935(a) (West 2001) (describing the functions, powers, and duties of the
Commission).
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (stating that the Commission's view on restrictive language policies when
applied at all times in the workplace and the presumption that such policies violate Title VII); see also CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7289.5(d) (2001) (noting that an employer may have a rule requiring employees to speak
only English at certain times only when the employer can show that the rule is a business necessity).
15. See E.E.O.C. v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding
that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination where employer implemented an "English
only" policy, immediately terminated Hispanic employees who refused to sign a memorandum regarding
implementation of the policy, and replaced the employees with non-Hispanic workers); see also Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (examining claim of intentional discrimination
based on restrictive language policy but finding no evidence of discriminatory intent).
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impact upon a particular group of employees.' 6 Several federal courts have
declined to follow the EEOC's regulations governing workplace language
policies."
California courts typically refer to federal court decisions interpreting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) for guidance when interpreting
California's anti-discrimination laws. s However, conflicting federal court
decisions regarding the legality of workplace language policies give little
guidance to California courts.' 9 The avoidance of conflicting interpretations of
FEHC regulations in California court decisions was one major impetus for the
enactment of Chapter 295 .2
A. Federal Law Governing Workplace Employment Policies
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEO Act) and Title VII prohibit
employers from discriminating based on an employee's national origin and
ancestry.2' Congress delegated enforcement of these laws to the EEOC.22 EEOC
regulations state that blanket "English only" policies in the workplace constitute
discrimination based on national origin and ancestry and are presumptively
invalid.23 Exceptions to the EEOC regulations are limited to circumstances in
16. See Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (establishing the legitimacy of a claim of
disparate impact under EEOC regulations where employer implemented a restrictive language policy without
any showing of business necessity). But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that
restrictive language policies do not have a disparate impact on bilingual employees because, following previous
case authority, compliance with the rule is a matter of preference and that preference is not a protected right
under Title VII).
17. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that, contrary to the
position advocated by the EEOC, the right to speak a language of choice is not a privilege of employment
protected by Title VII); accord Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1412; Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. Supp.
933,941 (E.D. Va. 1995).
18. See Pereira v. Schlage Elecs., 902 F. Supp. 1095, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that, although
the language of Title VIn and California Government Code section 12940 differ slightly, courts refer to federal
decisions where appropriate); see also County of Alameda v. F.E.H.C., 153 Cal. App. 3d 499, 504, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 381, 383 (1 st Dist. 1984) (referring to federal decisions in race discrimination case).
19. See Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1485 (declining to follow the EEOC regulations); accord Jurado,
813 F.2d at 1412; Long, 894 F. Supp. at 941.
20. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMiTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 5 (July 17, 2001).
21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (2001) (stating that unlawful employment actions include:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.).
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2001) (establishing the procedural regulations necessary for the EEOC to
carry out its responsibilities in the administration and enforcement of Title VII).
23. See id. § 1606.7(a) (stating that:
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which where the policy is justified by business necessity. 24 The employer must
also limit the policy to proscribed times, provide employees with adequate notice
of implementation of the policy, and inform employees of the potential penalties
for any violation. 5
Although the EEOC regulations create a presumption of discrimination upon
implementation of any "English only" policy,26 federal courts are not required to
follow them.27 Many federal courts uphold the EEOC guidelines as valid.
However, some federal courts have declined to follow EEOC recommendations
and have determined that a restrictive language policy does not deprive an
employee of a right created by Title VII.
29
B. California Law Governing Discrimination Based on National Origin or
Ancestry
Existing California law provides that, under FEHA, it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee based
on national origin or ancestry. ° Like the provisions of Title VII, discrimination is
[a] rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a
burdensome term and condition of employment. The primary language of an individual is
often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of
national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation[,] and
intimidation based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working
environment.).
24. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 1983 WL 651, at *23 (W.D. Wash. 1983), vacated on other
grounds, 827 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the employer met the burden of showing a business
necessity when errors in communication could have resulted in serious health risks at a fish cannery and serious
danger to fishermen going out to sea in bad weather).
25. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606.7(b)-(c) (2001).
26. See id. § 1606.7(a) (stating there is a presumption of discrimination when the "English only" policy
is implemented "at all times").
27. See Espinosa v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (noting that federal courts need not
defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are compelling indications that it is wrong, but
EEOC guidelines are generally given considerable deference as long they are consistant with Congressional
intent); see also Prado v. Luria & Son, 975 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that EEOC regulations
do not possess the force of law).
28. See E.E.O.C. v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (N.D: Tex. 2000) (finding
that an employer's blanket policy prohibiting employees from speaking any language but English constitutes
disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII); see also E.E.O.C. v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp.
2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (denying an employer's motion to dismiss based on finding that "English only"
rules could create a discriminatory atmosphere in a working environment).
29. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)
(explaining that the right to express cultural heritage through speaking a native language is not a right conferred
by Title VII); see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the right to
speak a language of choice is not a privilege of employment protected by Title VII); accord Jurado v. Eleven-
Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987); Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. Supp. 933, 941
(E.D. Va. 1995).
30. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on
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permissible under FEHA only where it is found to be based either on a "bona fide
occupational qualification"'" or on federal or state security concerns.32
The FEHC has stated that an employer who implements and enforces an
"English only" policy in the workplace violates FEHA regulations against
discrimination based on an employee's national origin and ancestry 3 However,
FEHC regulations also state that there are certain circumstances where an
employer may lawfully impose a restrictive language policy. 34 The prohibition
against restrictive language policies under state law is akin to that which exists
under federal regulation, namely, where a restrictive language policy is justified
by a "business necessity."35 FEHA regulations also require that the employer
notify employees of the circumstances and times when English is required and of
any potential consequences of violating the policy. 36 Even after a showing of
necessity and of proper notification, an "English only" policy may still be
unlawful where an alternative, less discriminatory practice would have the same
effect.37
III. CHAPTER 295
Chapter 295 codifies the FEHC Commission's regulations prohibiting the use
of restrictive language policies in the workplace.3" The new law states that "it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer39 to adopt or enforce a policy
"race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition,
marital status, sex or sexual orientation" as well as age, pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions).
31. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7286.7(a) (2001) (defining "bona fide occupational qualification" as a
practice which is "justified because all or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to safely and
efficiently perform the job in question and because the essence of the business operation would otherwise be
undermined"); see, e.g., McMillen v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 6 Cal. App. 4th 125, 131, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 554
(2nd Dist. 1992) (finding that a fire department's proscribed height and weight requirements are bona fide
occupational qualifications because they are based on considerations of public safety).
32. See Caton v. Canal Zone Gov't, 522 F. Supp. 1, 15-16 (D.C.Z. 1981) (holding that requiring United
States citizenry as a prerequisite to employment in a "security position" is not discriminatory because the
position is critical to the ongoing operation of United States activities in the Canal Zone).
33. See D.F.E.H. v. National Bindery Co., 1985 WL 62884 (Cal. F.E.H.C.) (finding that the employer
violated provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act which prohibit discrimination based on national
origin and ancestry by requiring a bilingual employee to speak only English while at the workplace).
34. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7289.5(d) (2001).
35. See id. § 7286.7(b) (2001) .(defining a business necessity as, "an overriding legitimate business
purpose [whereby a] practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of [a] business and ... effectively
fulfills the business purpose it is [designed] to serve.").
36. Id. § 7289.5(d); see also City and County of San Francisco v. F.E.H.C., 191 Cal. App. 3d 976, 990,
236 Cal. Rptr. 716, 730 (1st Dist. 1987) (stating that "the challenged practice must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser
differential ... impact" (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971)).
37. CAL. CODEREGS. tit. 2, § 7286.7(b) (2001).
38. ASSEMBLY COMMrITEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMIT-rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 1 (May 23,
2001).
39. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 2001) (defining "employer" as any person regularly
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that limits or prohibits the use of any language in any workplace, unless the
language restriction is justified by a business necessity.,, 40 Furthermore, in
accordance with FEHC regulations, Chapter 295 requires that employers notify
their employees of the implementation of such a policy and of potential
consequences for its violation.'
Chapter 295 manifests the clear intent of the Legislature to codify existing
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) regulations governing
workplace language policies.42  Moreover, Chapter 295 evidences the
Legislature's intent "to statutorily implement the constitutional protections
provided by Section 8 of Article I of the California Constitution, that no person
may be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or
employment because of national or ethnic origin.,, 3 However, Chapter 295 also
acknowledges that under the California Constitution, English is the official
language of the State."
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
A. Arguments in Support and Opposition of Chapter 295
Chapter 295 removes from California courts the authority to determine
whether workplace language policies discriminate on the basis of national origin
or ancestry and whether choice of language is protected by California statutory
law. By codifying the FEHA regulations governing workplace language policies,
the Legislature has determined that such policies, when implemented without
business necessity and proper notification, are indeed discriminatory, and the
right to speak one's language of choice is a properly protected activity under
California law.45
employing five or more persons in the State or any political or civil division of the State or its cities).
40. Id. § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295).
41. Id.
42. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITfTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 1 (July 17, 2001).
43. 2001 Legis. Serv. Ch. 295, sec. 1, at 95 (enacting CAL. GOv'TCODE § 12951).
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295); see CAL. CONST., art. In, § 6(a) (2001)
(stating that "English is the common language of the people of the United States of America and the State of
California. This section is intended to preserve, protect and strengthen the English language, and not to
supersede any of the rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution.").
45. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295) (stating that it is an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to adapt or enforce a policy that prohibits the use of any language unless the language
restricted is a business necessity and the employer has notified the employee); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 2 (July 17, 2001) (stating that "the imposition of an "English only" rule is
too often used to mask discrimination on the basis of national origin...").
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Proponents believe that Chapter 295 will achieve its stated purpose,46 which
is to further the goals of California's anti-discrimination statutes by eliminating
discrimination based on national origin.4 ' The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) asserts that workplace language policies discriminate against protected
groups, create an oppressive and intimidating workplace, harm morale by forcing
bilingual employees to monitor their speech, and may be used as a tool to "mask
intentional discrimination based on national origin. 4 s Proponents further assert
that the eradication of restrictive language policies would be beneficial to
business as workers may be able to communicate more effectively in their native
language.49
It is important to note that the Legislature substantially modified Chapter 295
in the committee hearing process before it was enacted in its current form,
addressing most of the arguments in opposition of its passage." As initially
proposed, Chapter 295 would have prohibited any workplace policy that
restricted the use of any specific language policy unless three specific conditions
existed.51 Prior to amendment, Chapter 295 also contained substantial penalty
provisions, including the right of any employee affected by the provision to bring
a civil action for equitable relief and an award of five thousand dollars to any
employee wrongfully subjected to a workplace language policy, regardless of
whether that employee's native language was one covered by the provisions of
the policy. 2 Due to the substantial burden of complying with the proposed
requirements of Chapter 295, as well as the penalty provisions, many groups
opposed the legislation in its initial form. 3 Opponents argued that Chapter 295
"created a trap for the unwary employer" and was "so detailed it would be
onerous for employers to follow."5 Opponents also asserted that the penalty
46. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 7 (Apr. 24, 2001)
(listing the supporters of Chapter 295: the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU), California Immigrant
Welfare Collaborative, Chinese for Affirmative Action, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Find, National Council of La Raza, and the Attorney General of California).
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See AB 800 (2001) (as amended July 20, 2001, but not enacted) (exhibiting text of Chapter 295 as
initially proposed, with amendments).
51. See id. (stating the conditions as follows: first, the policy had to specify the precise times and
situations under which it would be enforced; second, all employees affected by the policy were to be notified, in
writing, at least sixty days before the policy was implemented, the policy was to be distributed at
commencement of employment, and included in the employer's employment manual, and the notice to
employees was to include writing describing all of the potential sanctions for violation of the policy and any
available exceptions; and third, the policy must have been justified by an overriding business necessity.)
52. Id. § 3(b)(l) (enacted by Chapter 295).
53. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 7 (Apr. 24, 2001)
(listing the following as supporters of Chapter 295: California Manufacturers & Technology Association,
California Association of Health Facilities, California Employment Law Council, and California Chamber of
Commerce).
54. See id. at 6 (noting opposition to Chapter 295 by the California Manufacturers & Technology
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provisions were "unconscionable."55
Although, in its ,current form, Chapter 295 does not contain many details of
56the initially proposed legislation nor any of the penalty provisions, opponents
also argue that Chapter 295 is unnecessary. 7 This argument is bolstered by the
fact that FEHC regulations already contain provisions addressing employer
liability for implementing restrictive language policies absent business• 5 8 5
necessity. Opponents assert that the existing FEHC regulations are sufficient, 9 a
contention supported by the fact that enforcement of Chapter 295 will be handled
procedurally through the DFEH, and any remedies or damages remain the same
as those available under FEHA.6° However, proponents respond that Chapter 295
is necessary because agency regulations do not have the same effect as laws, and
courts are not obliged to follow them.' Chapter 295 provides "a clear state policy
on the issue[s] and give[s] guidance to state courts regarding [workplace
language] policies. 62
Opponents of Chapter 295 also query whether Chapter 295 violates the
California Constitution as amended by Proposition 63 in 1986.63 The Amendment
states,
[t]he Legislature and officials of the State of California shall take all
steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common language
of the State of California is preserved and enhanced... [t]he Legislature
shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the
common language of California.64
Proponents of Chapter 295 dismiss this contention, noting that the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the Amendment was primarily symbolic
Association).
55. See id. (citing objections voiced by the California Employment Law Counsel to provisions of
Chapter 295 and noting that it would be almost impossible for a small employer to comply with the restrictions
imposed on adoption of a workplace language policy).
56. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295).
57. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 3 (July 17, 2001) (noting
opposition by the California Chamber of Commerce); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 6 (Apr. 24, 2001) (citing the opposition of the California Employment
Law Council, which is based on its opinion that existing laws are sufficient).
58. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 6 (Apr. 24, 2001).
59. Id.
60. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 3 (July 17, 2001).
61. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 5 (Apr. 24, 2001)
(noting reasons why the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund supports Chapter 295).
62. Id.
63. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 3 (July 17, 2001)
(detailing the remaining concerns of the California Chamber of Commerce following the amendment to the text
of Chapter 295).
64. CAL. CONST., art. III, § 6(a) (2001).
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and concerned only government communications. Proponents also refer to the
official ballot pamphlet which stated that Proposition 63 did not prohibit the use
of languages other than English in private business.
B. The Removal of Discretion from California Courts
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Chapter 295 is how it removes from
California courts the determination of whether the right to speak ones' native
language is indeed a right protected by California law, which prohibitsS•67
discrimination based on national origin. A plaintiff alleging discrimination may
proceed upon one or both of two theories.68 The gravaman of the first theory is
that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, and the second
is that the employer's practices, while perhaps not intentional, nonetheless
affected the plaintiff's protected group in a disparate manner. 6' The employer
may rebut the presumption of discrimination and be relieved of liability by
establishing that the allegedly discriminatory practice was implemented based on
a legitimate business necessity.7°
Federal courts vary widely when it comes to addressing workplace language
policies. In the most restrictive decisions, courts have adjudged that such policies
do not raise an inference of national origin discrimination because employees do
not have the right to express cultural heritage through the use of native languages
in the workplace.' Moreover, unlike characteristics such as race, religion, and
country of origin, language is a "mutable" characteristic, at least for employees
who are bilingual . Following this line of reasoning, restrictive language policies
are not discriminatory because choice of language is not a protected activity, but
rather a preference. 3 These policies do not cause a discriminatory impact because
bilingual employees are able to comply with an employer's "English only"
65. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 3-4 (July 17, 2001)
(setting forth the response of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco's Employment Law Center and referring
to Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989)).
66. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 800, at 4 (July 17, 2001).
67. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295).
68. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining the theories upon
which a plaintiff may state a prima facie case for discrimination, namely, disparate treatment and disparate
impact).
69. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (setting out the
burden shifting analysis used to evaluate a claim of disparate treatment). First, plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision. Plaintiff must then prove that the employer's alleged reason for the
adverse employment decision is pretextual and that the real motive is discriminatory. Id.
70. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1486.
71. Id. at 1487; Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 1980).
72. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269 (identifying the difference between "mutable" and "immutable"
characteristics as being whether the characteristic is beyond the power of the employee to alter and stating that,
with the exception of religion, mutable characteristics are not protected by the EEO Act).
73. Id. at 270.
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policy. 4 Whether such rulings apply to employees who are not bilingual is
questionable."
Some federal courts have taken a more expansive view, in accordance with
the EEOC's regulations, by finding discrimination upon implementation of a
restrictive language policy." These courts follow the EEOC determination that
creation of such policies may create "an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and
intimidation based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory
working environment."" Furthermore, one district court ruled that an employee
may establish disparate impact by showing that bilingual employees are more
likely to lapse into their native language, and, as a result, they risk higher rates of
termination for violation of the policy.7"
Of the courts recognizing the EEOC's guidelines governing restrictive
language policies, some have found that an employer who proffers evidence of
business necessity shields himself from liability.79 Employers in occupations
which carry a high degree of actual or potential risk of health and safety
violations have consistently been able to establish necessity for their restrictive
language policies. 0 However, even where a legitimate business necessity is
established, adverse actions against employees for trivial violations of the policy
are discriminatory.8
Interestingly, some employers have implemented their policies in an attempt
to curtail alleged hostility and violence among their own workers." Here, what
74. Id.; accord Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1487.
75. See Gloor, 618 F.2d. at 270 (noting that language could be an immutable characteristic of a
monolingual employee). But see Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1488 (stating that an employee who only speaks
one language may be adversely affected by a restrictive language policy, but such a determination is an issue of
fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment).
76. E.E.O.C. v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Tex. 2000); E.E.O.C. v.
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill, 1999); Gutierrez v. Mun. S.E., 838 F.2d 1031,
1044 (9th Dist. 1988), vacated and remanded by 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2001).
78. See Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (finding that bilingual individuals engage in
inadvertent code switching, making them subject to adverse employment decisions when attempting to
communicate in an "English only" workplace).
79. See, e.g., Roman v. Cornell Univ., 53 F. Supp. 2d 223, 235-36 (N.D. N.Y. 1999) (allowing an
employer to establish business necessity by showing that the restrictive language policy was instilled to ease
office tensions); see also Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987) (showing business
necessity where a radio station prohibited an on-air personality from speaking in Spanish on a radio program in
order to target the program to certain listeners).
80. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 1983 WL 651 at *23 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (establishing
an adequate showing of business necessity where errors due to lack of communication in cannery could lead to
food contamination and greater danger while boating in bad weather); see also 31 BNA FEP Cases 1861
(finding a business necessity where a language policy covered refinery employees in danger of fire and
explosions).
81. See Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (stating that
although the oil refinery employer established a business necessity for its restrictive language policy, it was
discriminatory to fire an employee for speaking two words of Spanish in a non-hazardous situation).
82. See Roman, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (deciding that an employer-instituted policy requiring Spanish-
speaking employees to speak only English in front of non-Spanish-speaking coworkers was for a legitimate
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constitutes "business necessity" varies according to whether the employer
instituted the policy in response to actual complaints or merely due to perceived
but unsubstantiated threats. 3 As one court noted, the implementation of a
restrictive language policy in the workplace may actually increase the racial
tension between workers who are affected by the policy and those who are not. 4
Chapter 295 eliminates the determination of whether restrictive workplace
language policies are discriminatory and, consequently, limits the scope of any
future court rulings solely to a determination of an employer's defense of
business necessity. An employer may still rebut allegations of discrimination
based on national origin by showing the necessity for the policy. However, as
evidenced by the federal court rulings discussed above, "necessity" is itself an
uncertain threshold. Future cases will undoubtedly turn on the definition of
"business necessity." One court stated that a restrictive language policy must be
"necessary to the safe and efficient operation of business" and "effectively carry
out the business purpose it is alleged to serve."85 Moreover, an employer must
establish that there is no alternative practice which "would accomplish the
business purpose equally well with a lesser discriminatory impact.
86
V. CONCLUSION
The effect of Chapter 295 on discrimination based on national origin or
ancestry in the workplace remains to be determined. However, it is clear that
Chapter 295 removes the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
FEHC regulations are applicable by California courts.87 Historically, substantial
debate centered on whether restrictive workplace language policies were properly
classified as national origin discrimination and whether the right to speak a native
language is a right protected by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes.
Various courts have grappled with the question of whether such policies properly
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in accordance with state and federal
agency regulations, based on potential discriminatory effects.
Chapter 295 clearly manifests the California Legislature's determination that
implementation of a workplace language policy, without business necessity, is a
reason where there were allegations in the office that one employee was deliberately cutting others out of
conversations through her bilingual abilities); see also Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (implementing a policy in response to complaints that bilingual employees were ridiculing English-
speaking employees).
83. See Gutierrez v. Mun. S.E., 839 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Dist. 1988), vacated and remanded by 490
U.S. 1016 (1989) (noting that an employer may not implement restrictive language policies in order to prevent
bilingual workers from making discriminatory or insubordinate remarks where there is no showing that such
remarks had ever been made by the bilingual workers).
84. id.
85. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12951 (enacted by Chapter 295).
87. Id.
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violation of a protected right and constitutes actionable discrimination based on
national origin or ancestry.88 Hopefully, the new law will not serve to merely
create a trap for unwary employers, as feared by some opponents, but will instead
eliminate discrimination in the workplace-the ultimate goal of FEHA and the
State of California.
88. Id.
